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Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for 
Recognition of Afro-Mexicans: A Model 
for Native Americans? 
Sergio Gallegos 
JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
INTRODUCTION
Though it is well documented that some of Hernán Cortés’s 
companions during the conquest of the Mexica (Aztec) 
Empire were black men1 and that hundreds of thousands 
of African slaves were brought to New Spain during the 
colonial period and that they contributed greatly to the 
development of the territory,2 many Mexicans nowadays 
maintain that there are no black people in Mexico. But how 
can this be the case? One of the most common accounts 
that is offered to explain this assertion is that the African 
slaves brought to New Spain progressively mixed with 
white Spaniards and Amerindians, thus giving rise to a 
mestizo (mixed-race) population. In fact, this explanation 
has also been used to support the view that there is no 
racism in Mexico since all the different castes that existed 
during the colonial period gradually vanished after the 
Independence through a process of mestizaje (i.e., race-
mixing) that eventually homogenized the post-colonial 
Mexican population.3 
However, the thesis that pervasive mestizaje in Mexico 
has brought an end to racism by dismantling the racial 
distinctions made during the colonial period is a myth. In 
particular, various scholars have argued that the process of 
mestizaje has in fact strengthened and perpetuated certain 
forms of racism in Mexico to the extent that, by promoting 
the view that all Mexicans are mestizos, Mexicans whose 
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visible markers (i.e., skin color, hair texture) depart from a 
certain norm are racialized in ways that push them to the 
margins of Mexican society.4 
To be more specific, as the traditional narrative about 
modern Mexican identity typically stresses that Mexicans 
are descendants from Spaniards and Amerindians in 
different degrees of admixture, Mexicans who exhibit visible 
phenotypical markers associated with Afro-descendant 
populations often fail to be recognized as Mexicans by 
their own countrymen despite providing testimony about 
their national identity. In particular, when Afro-Mexicans 
(who traditionally live in isolated and impoverished rural 
communities in coastal states such as Guerrero, Oaxaca, 
and Veracruz) venture outside their communities, Mexican 
civil authorities often mistake them with undocumented 
Caribbean or Central American immigrants. In fact, in some 
cases, police officers and civil servants disbelieve the 
testimony of Afro-Mexicans about their national identity, 
thus resulting in consequences that range from a denial 
of services in government offices to actual deportations.5 
Given the occurrence of these situations, two pressing 
questions emerge: How can philosophy help us explain the 
systematic failure to recognize Afro-Mexicans as Mexicans? 
And can philosophy help to develop remedies to the 
treatment that Afro-Mexicans are subject to (i.e., being 
treated as strangers in their own country)? The pressing 
nature of these questions is further amplified by the fact 
that the treatment that Afro-Mexicans receive is not an 
isolated case, but rather part of a pattern of recognition 
failures that also afflicts other minorities in different 
geographic locations. In particular, Native Americans are 
often misrecognized as foreigners in the US by both civil 
authorities and average citizens.6 
My two main goals in this paper are to provide some 
tentative answers to these two prior questions by using 
some tools developed both by feminist epistemologists 
and recognition theorists—namely, the concepts of meta-
ignorance, epistemic injustice, and recognition—and to 
show how the application of these concepts to the situation 
of Afro-Mexicans illuminates how they are related to each 
other. After offering a brief account in Section 2 of how 
blackness was perceived in colonial times and in the post-
Independence period in Mexico to provide some context, 
I contend in section 3 that one can effectively explain the 
situations that many Afro-Mexicans face (i.e., having their 
Mexican identity questioned by others) in virtue of the fact 
that other Mexicans who fail to recognize their national 
identity are subject to what José Medina refers as “meta­
ignorance.” Using Medina’s analysis of the nature of meta-
ignorance and of the circumstances in which it arises, I 
show that the failure of recognition which Afro-Mexicans 
are subject to can be accounted for in terms of the 
existence of a first-level ignorance about the history and the 
current presence of Afro-descendants in Mexico, which is 
compounded by a second-level ignorance about the social 
relevance of race in Mexico—a second-level ignorance 
that is manifested in the belief that racial differences are 
nonexistent, or, at least, irrelevant in contemporary Mexico. 
In addition, I also show that the application of the notions 
of meta-ignorance, recognition, and epistemic injustice 
to this case illuminates the relationship among them in 
the following way: meta-ignorance creates relations of 
misrecognition, and these in turn promote instances of 
epistemic injustice (in particular, of testimonial injustice) 
that are directed against Afro-Mexicans. Subsequently, I 
show that the systematic misrecognition of Afro-Mexicans 
as Mexicans by many of their fellow countrymen has 
another deleterious effect, since it promotes instances of 
coerced silencing. Following Kristie Dotson, who maintains 
that “many forms of coerced silencing require some sort of 
capitulation or self-silencing on the part of the speaker,”7 
and using Rae Langton’s insight that certain forms of speech 
can be considered as silencing acts since they disable the 
conditions to make certain assertions,8 I show that in the 
case of some Afro-Mexicans (particularly from the state of 
Veracruz), testimony about their own identity illustrates in 
certain cases the occurrence of coerced silencing given 
that they often refer to themselves in conversations with 
others as “morenos” (“swarthy”), thus foreclosing further 
conversation about their African ancestry.    
Having done this, I then argue in section 4 that, in response 
to the epistemic injustice they suffer, some Afro-Mexicans 
(in particular, women) have engaged in activities that José 
Medina describes as instances of “epistemic resistance.”9 
In particular, I show that one of these instances of 
epistemic resistance by Afro-Mexicans involves a struggle 
for recognition that I label “self-referential empowerment,” 
which consists in a demand to be able to self-designate 
rather than letting others (in particular, Mexican civil 
authorities) name them. Using the taxonomy of different 
forms of recognition developed by Axel Honneth,10 I also 
show in this section that the struggle for recognition that 
Afro-Mexicans are engaged in has a dual dimension, which 
involves a demand for respect of civil rights and a demand 
for social esteem. Finally, in section 5, I provide a brief 
conclusion that aims to explore to which extent some of 
the strategies used by Afro-Mexicans in Mexico can be 
modeled or replicated in the US to address the situation 
faced by Native Americans, and I also sketch some lines of 
future inquiry. 
2. BLACKNESS IN MEXICO DURING COLONIAL
TIMES AND IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE
PERIOD
As I mentioned in the introduction, historians have 
documented extensively the vicissitudes of African men and 
women who were brought in large numbers to New Spain 
throughout the colonial period (1521–1810). In particular, 
Herman Bennett has maintained that by 1640, Spaniards had 
imported 275,000 slaves from West and Central Africa into 
New Spain in order to replace Amerindian populations as 
sources of labor,11 since some groups had been decimated 
as a result of diseases introduced by Europeans.12 Now, in 
the framework of the Spanish colonial system (which was 
structured on the basis of caste divisions), African slaves 
were perceived, as Gates and Appiah have pointed out, 
under a negative light, and, in virtue of this, “they were 
invariably placed at the bottom of the hierarchical society 
that the Spaniards had established.”13 Given their position 
at the bottom of the hierarchical Novohispanic society, 
African slaves and their descendants pursued different 
strategies to resist or subvert the oppression they were 
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subject to. In particular, while some openly revolted and 
escaped from plantations to remote mountainous areas 
where they established free settlements (palenques),14 
others sought to undermine the colonial caste system 
from within by assimilating to the upper castes, learning 
their language and mixing progressively with Spaniards, 
Amerindians, and mestizos in order to climb the social 
ladder. This climbing was made possible in part by the fact 
that, in contrast to the North American English colonies, 
the one-drop rule did not exist in New Spain. As a result of 
this, while caste divisions were established and enforced 
by colonial authorities, their borders were rather porous 
and could be challenged in individual cases within the 
court system. Thus, while blackness was perceived within 
the Novohispanic colonial framework as a feature that was 
demoting or devaluating for individuals, it was not deemed 
to be a characteristic that was fixed once and for all in 
populations, which were considered to be capable of racial 
transformation over time.15 
Even after the triumph of the independence movement 
in 1821 and the official abolition of caste divisions, 
phenotypical and cultural markers of blackness remained 
features that pushed individuals to the margins of Mexican 
society, making them both invisible and foreign at once. 
In light of this, one can then maintain, using the notion 
of cultural imperialism articulated by Iris Marion Young, 
that Afro-Mexicans have been traditionally subject to 
cultural imperialism, since “victims of cultural imperialism 
are (. . .) rendered invisible as subjects, as persons with 
their own perspective and group-specific experience and 
interests. At the same time, they are marked out, frozen 
into a being marked as Other, deviant in relation to the 
dominant norm.”16 One of the manifestations of this cultural 
imperialism was that although several prominent Mexican 
politicians and intellectuals throughout the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century (in particular, 
Justo Sierra and Francisco Bulnes) vigorously debated how 
the project of building a strong and modern nation and 
creating a common Mexican identity should unfold, none 
of the proposals that were articulated acknowledged the 
significant presence of Afro-descendants in the territory 
and their economic and cultural contributions to the 
Mexican mosaic.17 As a result of this neglect, though the 
ideology of mestizaje (or race-mixing) was promoted by 
members of the Mexican intellectual and political elite such 
as José Vasconcelos (1925) and Manuel Gamio (1916) as 
a policy that that would allow Mexicans to finally turn the 
page on the lingering racial divisions and discriminations 
inherited from their colonial past, it actually operated, as 
Christina Sue has pointed out, as “a mechanism to whiten 
the country through the dilution and eventual elimination 
of the country’s black and indigenous populations.”18 
In particular, while some photographers such as Romualdo 
García (1852–1930) and Agustín Casasola (1874–1938) 
documented during the late nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth century the presence of people of visible 
African descent in Mexico, as Wendy Phillips has shown,19 
systematic efforts were made to ignore (or, at least, 
downplay) the role of Afro-descendants in the construction 
of the Mexican nation to the point that an important theme 
in several Mexican movies and novels in the late 1940s, 
1950s, and the early 1960s was the ignorance of one’s Black 
heritage.20 Moreover, insofar as blackness was implicitly 
perceived as a stain or a badge of shame, any cultural 
expressions associated with it (such as certain types of 
culinary practices or musical compositions) were either 
systematically suppressed or attributed to the mestizaje 
process while deliberately ignoring or whitewashing their 
African roots. For instance, in the 1940s, certain regional 
musical expressions from Veracruz with African influence 
progressively became symbols of Mexican culture on the 
national stage while their origins were ignored, as Theodore 
Cohen has argued: 
As “La Bamba” became a popular song in the 
radio, in politics and in feature films, it became a 
national symbol that sometimes lost any affiliation 
with blackness. In the mid to late 1940s the 
Mexico City-based radio station XEQ regularly 
broadcast Baquiero Foster’s Suite Veracruzana No. 
1 on the Sunday evening [program] “‘El Instituto 
Salvador Díaz Mirón’ Sección cultural del Casino 
de Veracruz.” The program celebrated the history 
and culture of Veracruz. . . . One commentator 
declared that “La Bamba” etymologically and 
musically originated in Andalusia, Spain. There was 
no reference to indigeneity or blackness.21 
Now, considering the strength of this tremendous social 
pressure to negate or make invisible blackness in Mexico 
in the post-Independence period, I argue that, given this 
historical context, it is not very surprising that people of 
visible African descent in Mexico have been subject to 
forms of epistemic injustice such as disbelieving their 
testimony when they are asked about their nationality. In 
my view, this can be explained in terms of the fact that most 
Mexicans are subject to what José Medina has referred to 
as meta-ignorance. 
3.  RACIAL META-IGNORANCE,
MISRECOGNITION, AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
IN MEXICO
One can explain the epistemic injustice that Afro-Mexicans 
are subject to when they give testimony about their national 
identity in terms of the presence of a meta-ignorance that 
is prevalent in Mexican society. In order to appreciate how 
this meta-ignorance affects mainstream Mexicans, let 
me first briefly rehearse how Medina characterizes meta-
ignorance in racial relations with others. Following Medina, 
one can characterize meta-ignorance, which is a specific 
type of ignorance about one’s beliefs or cognitive gaps, 
by distinguishing it from another type of ignorance, which 
operates at the level of objects: 
On the one hand, there are specific things we 
should know about the racialized subjects we 
interact with: for example, how they think about 
themselves, how society thinks of them, the 
history and current status of the social positionality 
of their group, and the history and current status of 
the social relationality that binds the perceived and 
perceiving subject together. One may fail to know 
all kinds of specific things in these areas; and these 
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failures constitute (some degree of) first-order or 
object-level of racial ignorance. But, on the other 
hand, specific mistaken beliefs or lack of beliefs 
about the racial others with whom we interact 
may be rooted in and supported by very general 
attitudes about them and about social relationality: 
for example, the inability to see racial others in their 
differences—blindness to racial differences; or the 
assumption that racial differences are irrelevant 
to one’s life—blindness to the social relevance of 
race. Here we would have a second-order or meta-
level ignorance, which is what I have termed racial 
meta-blindness: blindness to one’s blindness, 
insensitivity to insensitivity.22 
In the case of Afro-Mexicans, I contend that the epistemic 
injustice that they endure vis-à-vis their testimony about 
their national identity is the product of a racial meta-
ignorance that most other Mexicans are victims of. This type 
of meta-ignorance arises in virtue of the fact that, as the 
school curriculum has traditionally privileged the narrative 
according to which modern Mexicans are the descendants of 
Spaniards and Amerindians in various degrees of admixture, 
most Mexicans nowadays associate the presence of the 
descendants of African slaves in Mexico with the colonial 
period, and thus fail to consider them as part of the fabric 
of contemporary Mexican society.23 This type of ignorance, 
which is a first-order or object-level ignorance insofar as 
it pertains to the current status of the descendants of 
African slaves, has been compounded by the fact that most 
Mexicans tend to believe, given the pervasive myth that 
the process of mestizaje has homogenized Mexican society 
and erased the racial divisions imposed by the colonial 
caste system, that racial differences have either vanished in 
contemporary Mexico, or that they have become irrelevant 
in everyday life. Thus, the development of a second-order 
or meta-level racial ignorance has led most Mexicans 
to ignore the social relevance of race in Mexico, and the 
effects of this ignorance are manifested in various facets 
of life. For instance, given that this meta-ignorance erases 
racial differences by perpetuating the belief that Mexicans 
are racially homogenous, it shapes common patterns of 
social identification by systematically making mainstream 
Mexicans associate phenotypical markers of blackness 
(e.g., skin color or hair texture) with foreignness.24 And since 
Afro-Mexicans are often misidentified as foreigners, they 
tend to be subject to a deep credibility deficit, which can 
be a type of epistemic injustice,25 because they are often 
taken to be undocumented Caribbean or Central American 
migrants that use Mexico as a platform to ultimately reach 
the US when they travel outside their communities.26 
Considering this, the situation that Afro-Mexicans endure 
casts light on the relationship between the notions of 
meta-ignorance, recognition, and epistemic injustice. The 
racial meta-ignorance that has traditionally been created 
and maintained in Mexico through the ideology of an 
homogenizing mestizaje underpins a particular relation 
of misrecognition, and this failure of recognition in turn 
supports the emergence of instances of epistemic injustice 
in which the testimony that Afro-Mexicans give about their 
national identity is systematically doubted or challenged 
by other Mexicans. The illumination of the relations 
between these three notions is of crucial importance 
because it suggests that failures of recognition, which are 
often driven by forms of ignorance, promote instances of 
epistemic injustice. And, if this is indeed the case, this is 
potentially quite useful since the nature of the relationships 
between the three notions suggests that, in order to 
remedy the systematic instances of epistemic injustice 
created by misrecognition, we have to push back against 
the forms of ignorance that create and perpetuate failures 
of recognition. 
Having clarified this, I want to examine some reactions 
that Afro-Mexicans display to the epistemic injustice they 
are subject to. In particular, I argue that one usual type 
of reaction that Afro-Mexicans have developed involves 
developing certain attitudes that correspond to what 
Dotson calls “coerced silencing,” which obtains when 
“a speaker capitulates to the pressure to not introduce 
unsafe, risky testimony.”27 It is my contention that a form of 
coerced silencing can be appreciated in the case of certain 
Afro-Mexicans, when they are questioned about their 
identity. For instance, Henry Louis Gates Jr. has provided, 
in his recent book Black in Latin America, a clear example 
of this coerced silencing among some Afro-Mexicans when 
narrating a conversation that one of his hosts in Mexico, 
Sagrario Cruz-Carretero (who is an Afro-Mexican professor 
at the Universidad Veracruzana), had with her grandfather 
in her late teens. As Gates points out in his narration, when 
Cruz-Carretero traveled to Cuba, she came to discover 
that “my family was black—because [Cubans] looked like 
my grandfather, like my father. I started tasting the food 
and I said ‘Oh, my God—this is the food my grandmother 
prepares at home’.”28 After describing to Gates Jr. the 
realization of her Black heritage and the feelings that this 
generated in her, Cruz-Carretero subsequently narrates to 
him the interactions with her grandfather: “I came back to 
Mexico and I asked my grandpa why he never told me we 
were Black. And he told me, holding my hand, “We are not 
Black; we’re morenos.”29 
I contend that the assertion of Cruz-Carretero’s grandfather 
is a clear case of coerced silencing. Indeed, if we agree 
with the claim, made by Rae Langton, that “it is possible 
to use speech to disable speakers and possible to 
prevent them from satisfying the felicity conditions for 
some illocutions they may want to perform,”30 one may 
argue that, in claiming a moreno identity, Cruz-Carretero’s 
grandfather aimed to disable the line of inquiry undertaken 
by her regarding the family’s African ancestry. This form 
of coerced silencing is prevalent among many old Afro-
Mexicans, who often prefer to pass as Indigenous rather 
than accepting a Black identity. Indeed, since indigeneity is 
acknowledged by virtually all as a familiar and recognizable 
feature of individuals within the Mexican social fabric (in 
spite of being a negative social marker) while blackness is 
perceived as a foreign and potentially disruptive element, 
the deployment of this strategy enables its users to push 
back partially against failures of recognition of their 
Mexican identity since being moreno does not preclude 
(as being Black very often does) being Mexican in the 
collective imagination. However, despite the tremendous 
social pressure that has traditionally existed to hide, 
downplay, or ignore blackness in Mexico, it is important to 
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emphasize that not all Afro-Mexicans have bowed to this 
pressure and that certain groups (particularly, associations 
of women from the Costa Chica region that overlaps 
Guerrero and Oaxaca in the Pacific coast) have in the last 
three decades developed various attitudes and actions 
that can be properly considered as constituting a type of 
epistemic resistance. 
4. ‘SOMOS AFRO-MEXICANAS’: SELF­
REFERENTIAL EMPOWERMENT AND OTHER
FORMS OF EPISTEMIC RESISTANCE DEVELOPED
BY AFRO-MEXICAN WOMEN 
As I mentioned at the end of the previous section, in 
response to the traditional social pressure to either conceal 
or ignore their African heritage, a number of Afro-Mexicans 
from the Costa Chica region (particularly, women) have 
engaged in actions to push back against the epistemic 
injustice that they suffer. Echoing Medina, I maintain that 
these actions are forms of epistemic resistance since they 
involve “the use of our epistemic resources and abilities 
to undermine and change oppressive normative structures 
and the complacent cognitive-affective functioning that 
sustains this structure.”31 
One of the axes pursued by Afro-Mexican activists has 
consisted in pressuring institutions of higher education 
such as the National School of Anthropology and History to 
modify the school and university curriculum to make visible 
the African heritage of Mexico. This is of great importance 
given that, as Carlos López Beltrán and Vivette García 
Deister have emphasized, most of the anthropological 
and medical research undertaken in Mexico during the 
twentieth century was focused almost exclusively on 
Amerindian and mestizo groups, leaving aside Afro-Mexican 
groups whose invisibility was then further reinforced and 
perpetuated.32 Considering this, one of the main victories 
of the epistemic resistance led by Afro-Mexican groups has 
been the establishment in May 2017 of a UNESCO Chair at 
the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) 
that is devoted to the study of Afro-descendants in Mexico 
and Central America.33 
In addition to the creation of spaces for the study of the 
African diasporic experience in Mexico, another axis 
of epistemic resistance has been the struggle of Afro-
Mexicans to be recognized in the national census and 
to be able to choose how they want to be named. In my 
view, this has been the most difficult struggle because 
it aims to roll back deliberate and systematic efforts by 
the Mexican state to eliminate racial distinctions in the 
twentieth century. Indeed, after the 1921 national census, 
the Mexican government stopped collecting data about 
the racial status of the different regional subpopulations 
that inhabit Mexico under the assumption that using racial 
categories in the census promoted and perpetuated 
racism.34 However, although this deliberate ignorance vis-
à-vis any racial origin or status of people was well intended, 
it had some perverse consequences since it made Afro-
Mexicans demographically and legally invisible. 
As a result of this, Afro-Mexican communities (which are 
still nowadays among the most socially marginalized and 
impoverished in Mexico, often lacking electricity, running 
water, sanitation, or basic health-care services) have been 
traditionally disadvantaged with respect to Amerindian 
communities. Indeed, Amerindian communities have been 
usually recognized by the Mexican state on the basis of 
linguistic affiliation and, in virtue of this, data have been 
collected in the national census concerning the lacks 
and lags that they suffer. Because of this, the Mexican 
government was able to devise and implement development 
policies which, though exhibiting a very mixed track record, 
have been at least aimed to alleviate the marginalized and 
impoverished situation of Amerindian groups. However, 
since Afro-Mexicans became demographically and legally 
invisible as a group (even though individuals were singled 
out as potential undocumented foreigners) in virtue of 
the cultural imperialism they were subject to, no targeted 
efforts were made to improve their material conditions. 
In virtue of this, some Afro-Mexican women have developed 
a form of epistemic resistance that I call referential self-
empowerment. This form of epistemic resistance has 
consisted in organizing their communities to pressure 
the Mexican government to include, once again, racial 
designations in the national census to be able to identify 
them and, rather than letting the government impose 
certain categories to designate them, to retain the right of 
how they want to be named and recognized. And as one of 
their spokeswomen, Yolanda Camacho, explained in a 2016 
interview, after organizing a debate in their communities 
on this issue, they agreed that they want to be named 
and politically recognized as “Afro-Mexicanas” rather than 
as “costeñas,” “morenasm,” “negras,” “mascogas,” or 
“jarochas” because “we are descendants of Africa, but we 
live in Mexico, we were born in Mexico, we are in Mexico.”35 
In virtue of this, the process that Afro-Mexican women 
have followed to resist the epistemic injustice consists 
in articulating a positive double identity (as descendants 
of Africa and as Mexicans) and demanding that they are 
recognized as possessing this double identity. As a result 
of the pressure exerted by various Afro-Mexican NGOs, the 
Mexican government allowed a question about racial self­
adscription to be included in its 2015 national census so 
that people of African descent in Mexico could be identified 
as Afro-Mexicans if they so chose. In undertaking these 
actions, I contend that Afro-Mexican women activists have 
implicitly adopted a general recommendation put forth 
by Young for victims of cultural imperialism, which is that 
“having formed a positive self-identity through organization 
and public cultural expression, those oppressed by cultural 
imperialism can then confront the dominant culture with 
demands for recognition of their specificity.”36 
It is important to point out here that the demands for 
recognition that Afro-Mexicans make have a dual nature: 
as Camacho emphasizes in the interview, they want to be 
recognized specifically as descendants of Africa and as 
Mexicans. This is important because the recognition that 
they demand has a double dimension. On one side, Afro-
Mexicans want to be recognized as Mexican citizens who 
are entitled, just as any other Mexicans, to the same civil 
and social rights that their fellow countrymen enjoy. In 
virtue of this, one aspect of the Afro-Mexicans’ demand for 
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recognition involves a specific pattern of intersubjective 
recognition that depends on being accepted in a community 
of equal citizens where all are entitled to the same civil 
and social rights. This form of recognition, which Honneth 
labels “legal recognition,” is important since it is tied to 
the acknowledgment of the obligation to respect certain 
rights. In particular, as Honneth remarks, “in being legally 
recognized, one is now respected with regard not only 
to the abstract capacity to orient oneself vis-à-vis moral 
norms, but also to the concrete human feature that one 
deserves the social standard of living necessary for this.”37 
On the other side, Afro-Mexicans want to be recognized 
as descendants of Africa who are different in their 
specificity from other groups of Mexicans. In virtue of 
this, the other aspect of the Afro-Mexicans’ demand for 
recognition involves a different pattern of intersubjective 
recognition that depends on becoming socially esteemed 
for possessing certain characteristics that differentiate 
one’s particular group from others while contributing, 
nonetheless, to the collective realization of societal goals. 
This form of recognition, which Honneth terms “social 
esteem,” is also important since it is tied to the development 
of a positive self-valuation that drives individuals to 
acknowledge and take pride in the contributions that their 
specific characteristics allow them to make to society. 
Indeed, as Honneth observes, “people can feel themselves 
to be ‘valuable’ only when they know themselves to be 
recognized for accomplishments that they precisely do not 
share in an undifferentiated manner with others.”38 
For Afro-Mexican activists, achieving these two forms 
of recognition is a very important step, given that when 
Afro-Mexicans have gained not only legal recognition but 
also social esteem from other Mexicans, they will not only 
become visible as an important group that that has been 
(and is) a crucial part of the Mexican nation, but they will also 
be able, as individuals, to develop symmetrical relations of 
solidarity with other Mexicans. Thus, for Yolanda Camacho 
and other activists, the struggles for legal recognition and 
social esteem (which are two parallel forms of epistemic 
resistance) are of the utmost importance since they view 
them as gateways to the achievement of a true social 
equality. Because of this, they clearly accept the insight of 
Young, who has maintained that “groups cannot be socially 
equal unless their specific experience, culture and social 
contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized.”39 
Indeed, according to these activists, once there are actual 
data on the total number of Afro-Mexicans, the locations 
where they live, their levels of health and educational 
attainment, Afro-Mexican communities will be in a better 
position to demand from the Mexican government targeted 
intervention policies to improve their material conditions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Let me recap. I have argued that, in response to the 
epistemic injustice that they have been traditionally 
subject to when they are questioned by other Mexicans 
(in particular, by police officers and other civil authorities) 
about the intersection of their national and racial identities 
(which is an epistemic injustice that is rooted in a relation 
of misrecognition), Afro-Mexicans deploy at least two 
different responses. While some resort to some form of 
coerced silencing, others have developed certain types of 
epistemic resistance in order to create beneficial epistemic 
friction that would force the vast majority of other 
Mexicans to acknowledge their existence and recognize 
them as both descendants of Africa and as Mexicans. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, I am interested in exploring 
briefly whether some of these strategies can be replicated 
in the US to address the situation of Native Americans, 
which is very similar to that of Afro-Mexicans. Indeed, 
various scholars have pointed out that “what differentiates 
Native Americans [from other minorities] is that they 
uniquely experience absolute invisibility in many domains 
in American life,”40 and this invisibility causes them to be 
misrecognized as foreigners (in particular, as Mexicans). 
Now, though Native Americans have been recognized in the 
US census for a longer period than Afro-Mexicans have in 
the Mexican census, they are subject to policies by the US 
federal government that have made them invisible to the 
extent that they usually have to prove a certain degree (or 
blood quantum) of Nativeness to be recognized as Native 
Americans.41 This is particularly problematic, as Native 
Americans themselves stress, because these policies not 
only divide them against each other, but they also promote 
in the long run a dilution of Nativeness, thus paving the 
way to a situation in which, once they are erased, the 
federal government will no longer have to respect treaties 
and will be able to take over Native American lands and 
resources.42 In virtue of this, perhaps a way in which Native 
Americans could exert epistemic resistance against the 
treatment they are subject to would consist in collectively 
organizing (as Afro-Mexicans have done) to pressure the US 
federal government to change the ways in which they are 
recognized at the national and state level. In future work, I 
intend to explore whether other potential strategies (such 
as collective organizing to put pressure on film and other 
media industries to change the traditional representations 
of Afro-Mexicans in Mexico and of Native Americans in 
the US) could be effective to change the relations of 
misrecognition that give rise to epistemic injustices on 
both sides of the US-Mexico border.   
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